

Maoist Violence in Panchayat Extension Scheduled Areas

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Received on 04.11.2019; **Accepted on** 27.11.2019

How to cite this article:

Swapan Kumar Kolay. Maoist Violence in Panchayat Extension Scheduled Areas. Indian J Res Anthropol. 2019;5(2):85-94.

Abstract

Development concept is linked with the "Psycho-sociological" determinants and moreover, it is intertwined with the peaceful conditions in any country, then only the citizens can enjoy the fruits which out of it. Maoist violence, which has emerged as the biggest internal security challenge since independence, in India subcontinent, the people of the county and Governments experienced many odds and ills due to this structural problem. Many instances reveled in the history that hatred conditions yields poverty and its related problems at the bottom. Maoist violence to develop and grow; evaluate efficacies of different Governmental approaches to handle Maoist violence; and understand the factors influencing public perception of Maoist violence. The Government of India enacted PESA Act for the local governance in Tribal areas, the Panchayats Extension to the Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996 came into force on the 24th December, 1996. Though the PESA is enforced, tribal regions are still in a state of underdevelopment due to various systemic and structural reasons. The reasons are complex, and multi-pronged. It also needs to be pointed out that tribal areas where the Maoism is existed the locations are militarized and under the grip of security forces. The local administration is unable to discharge their duties for the empowerment of the tribal communities. The villages in Maoist dominated areas lost confidence in successive Governments because of the land grabbing and facing livelihood problems, the tribes are struggling between the Maoist and the Government especially by militarization of PESA areas, because of this reason the local governance is blocked and the desirable development is not seen.

Keywords: Maoist violence, Panchayat Extension Scheduled Area (PESA), Development, Governance, Government.

Introduction

Economic prosperity is only possible with sustained economic growth and harmonious conditions. The internal security provides these conditions happen true. Of the 106 Maoist extremist affected districts in the country today, 32 are PESA districts, according to official estimates. Drawing on a four

decade old movement of militant left politics, the CPI (Maoist) was formed in September 2004, by merging the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) and the Maoist Communist Centre. Its spread currently extends across significant parts of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, leading to the term, 'The Red Corridor'. This includes the epicenter of the

banned party's base in the Dandakaranya region, a vast forested area on the borders of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Orissa. While the senior leadership of the party is mostly drawn from non-tribal communities, much of the rank and file comes from local villages and has built on their grievances emanating from the non-implementation of PESA. The CPI (Maoist), which is the major Maoist organization responsible for most incidents of violence/killings in PESA locations. Almost all the conflicts underlying such violence are decades old, with strong local roots (Acharya, 2006, p.320).

The Maoist problem has roots way back to Colonial period. They grabbed all natural resources from the people who are actual owners of those resources. The British rulers promoted different administration which was not acceptable to the local people.

The Zamindari system was adopted during the British Raj wherein a piece of land was given to a Zamindar and in return, he was required to pay a certain amount to the company or the state. The Zamindar did not cultivate the land himself; this had affected the poor tribal people who were directly embraced with the land. The deprived tribal people adopted different form of agitation. Later on the Indian government changed the governance strategy and helped the tribal toward empowerment, but the strategies were bounced back due to systemic problems. Thus, the state government, the contractors, and lower level officials fully exploited the tribals, bringing down their status to that of encroachers in the forests. The Jal (water), Jungle and Jamin (Land) are the primary resources of the tribal; these resources are invariably exploited by the Government and Private Players. The poor lack ownership of or access to assets such as land, water, forest, a dwelling unit, credit, literacy, longevity, voice and capital both physical and social (Mehta and Shah, 2001), may revolt against the State. The rehabilitation and payment of compensation for lands and assets acquired from the tribal for various purposes have been very poor. For certain tribal families, it has meant generations of resettlement without being given any compensation. This has led to deprivation and marginalization of the people. However, the industrialization was not the answer for the prey tribal. Moreover, "In areas influenced by the Naxalite Movement the poor have started exercising their right to vote (Bharti 1990)."

Even post-independence, the agrarian reforms did not reach the tribal areas. The solutions like

Bhoodan and *Gramdan* were not effective for the empowerment of the tribal. Corruption, vote bank politics and atrocities against the Scheduled Castes and Tribes played havoc with the economic and social fabric of the society. The malfunctioning of Government machinery in terms of inefficiency, corruption and exploitation was largely considered as the main factor behind the creation of a power vacuum as well as a space for Maoist to take root in the country. Iyer (2009) looks at all terrorist incidents in the Indian subcontinent and infers that lagging regions are more prone to conflicts. Maoist insurgents engage in systematic attacks on development works in an effort to undermine the Government's authority and perceived effectiveness. They have targeted school buildings, railways, roads, and power and telecom infrastructure (MHA, 2010a, p. 17).

Many government programs did not reach the tribal due to poor governance. However, the PESA was the answer such those problems, although it did not served expectedly. The Maoist further argue that in the light of the states insensitivity towards the problems of the weaker sections, only their party's ideology and methods can resolve the exploitation faced by the tribals. Government analyses the development deficit roots in the Maoist affected districts:

- i. More than 3/4th of the people living in the PESA area have a low standard of living index.
- ii. Female literacy for most districts is below the national average
- iii. Less than 1/4th of the population lives in pucca houses
- iii. Less than 1/3rd of the population have an electricity connection

But while party proclamations and the evidence of poor development and governance support this hypothesis of economic liberalization fuelling socio-economic disparities, resulting in political extremism, it is necessary to note that the Maoist party, like all political outfits, seeks political power. One civil rights worker in the PESA area of Khammam, Andhra Pradesh reflected on this altering nature: 'When the Maoists first came here decades ago, their work was much needed, they agitated for better rates for tendu leaves sold by the adivasis and for minimum wages. But today, the party has become corrupt, power hungry and intolerant of any difference.' Another advocate said, 'We also fight for the same issues as them, namely the dignity of the tribal, and the upholding

of the Constitution by the powerful. But we adopt non-violent methods, and so we seem like a threat to the Maoists.'

However, the Maoist today have a dual effect on the ground in PESA areas. By virtue of the gun they wield, they are able to evoke some fear in the administration at the village/ block/ district level. They consequently prevent the common villager's powerlessness over the neglect or violation of protective laws like PESA, e.g. warning a *talathi*, who might be demanding bribes in return for fulfilling the duty mandated to him under the Forest Rights Act, a trader who might be paying an exploitative rate for forest produce or a contractor who is violating the minimum wage. It was found to be violating the Forest Rights Act, the Forest Conservation Act, the Environment Protection Act and the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, which applies to STs covered under the 5th Schedule of the Constitution of India (Nai Azadi Udghosh, 2010).

On the other hand, the Maoist ideology is brutal and cynical. It attacks perceived class opponents and even carries out political assassinations, e.g. Panchayat members from rival political parties, who might have proximity to the administration and are seen as exploiters of the people or a political threat. Further, the party's violence is now resulting in an armed response from the state with the nebulous aim of ending Maoist influence on the ground and extending the states control villages in their control. As a result of this, there is increasingly no middle ground in PESA areas and communities here face violence and displacement.

The atrocities of Maoist was not accepted by some areas in Chhattisgarh and similarly the extra-constitutional Salwa Judums scorched earth policy have also induced displacement which current policies are not adequately responsive to.

This effort made many Maoists has fled to e.g. Khammam in Andhra Pradesh or Malkangiri in Orissa are also Fifth Schedule areas, these displaced communities are treated as non-citizens at best, or Maoist supporters at worst. What is the effect of all this on PESAs implementation? Such conditions of tumult have disrupted normal life, rendering PESA meaningless on the ground. While security personnel do not have a direct role in the implementation of PESA, the effect of the current militarization means they must concentrate power in their hands in order to win the armed conflict. PESA did not envisage this extreme scenario, and so its provisions are not geared to address such challenges. Therefore it is necessary for policy makers to ask if and how the state's security aims can be reconciled on the ground with respect towards a law like PESA, which emphasizes devolution of power to tribal people.

The efforts of the Central and State Government in militarization of the PESA area has to be reviewed with the local people those who are facing the direct problem. The irony is that the administration is blaming the Maoist and the local people are blaming the administration for the poor implementation of the programs and policies for the empowerment of the tribes. A comprehensive and holistic approach to the problem needs to address not only immediate dangers posed by armed men, but also infrastructure needs and economic development, provision of basic services, more effective democratic representation, and the quality of governance (Christensen and Læg Reid, 2007).

The data accentuated that these districts are badly affected by the Maoist insurgence movement. The Government interventions are not yielded results; however the people are at the risk. These incidents are slowing down the development and empowerment process.

Table 1: List of Twenty Four Critical Maoist Affected Area

S. No.	State	District
1	Andhra Pradesh	Visakhapatnam
2	Bihar	Gaya
3	Bihar	Jamui
4	Chhattisgarh	Balrampur
5	Chhattisgarh	Bijapur
6	Chhattisgarh	Sukma
7	Chhattisgarh	Kanker
8	Chhattisgarh	Narayanpur
9	Jharkhand	Chatra
10	Jharkhand	Garhwa
11	Jharkhand	Gumla

S. No.	State	District
12	Jharkhand	Latehar
13	Jharkhand	Palamau
14	Jharkhand	West Singhbhum
15	Madhya Pradesh	Balaghat
16	Maharashtra	Gadchiroli
17	Orissa	Gajapati
18	Orissa	Kandhamal
19	Orissa	Koraput
20	Orissa	Malkangiri
21	Orissa	Nuapada
22	Orissa	Rayagada
23	Uttar Pradesh	Sonebhadra
24	West Bengal	Midnapore West

Source: Minister for Rural Development, Govt. of India, New Delhi, 2013.

From Table 2, it is evident that Chhattisgarh is the most troubled state, followed by Jharkhand. Orissa, West Bengal and Bihar, in that order have recorded the highest number of fatalities in the past three years. Thus, these four states could be termed as the most affected states, where as Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh have recorded considerable number of fatalities and could be ranked next in intensity. Thus, in all, the Maoist problem is spread across these seven states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal,

Bihar, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, while in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala the movement is in the organizational phase. Available reports also indicate that some rudimentary Maoist activity has also been detected in Jammu and Kashmir and Assam, where the Maoist bare said to have investigated if the ground conditions are favourable to launch the movement there.

Table 2: State-wise Fatalities in Maoist Violence, 2008–2010

State	2008				2009				2010			
	Incidents	Civ	SF	Maoist	Incidents	Civ	SF	Maoist	Incidents	Civ	SF	Maoist
Andhra Pradesh	92	45	1	37	66	18	0	18	100	24	-	16
Bihar	164	52	21	15	232	47	25	16	307	72	25	20
Chhattisgarh	620	157	85	66	529	163	127	137	625	171	172	102
Jharkhand	484	169	38	50	752	140	68	76	501	132	25	49
Maharashtra	68	17	5	7	154	41	52	23	94	35	10	3
Madhya Pradesh	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	7	-	1	-
Orissa	103	28	73	32	266	36	31	13	218	62	17	25
Uttar Pradesh	4	-	-	2	8	2	-	2	6	1	-	-
West Bengal	35	19	7	1	255	144	14	9	350	221	35	61
Others	14	3	1	3	5	-	-	-	4	-	-	-
Total	1591	490	231	213	2268	591	317	294	2212	718	285	276

Source: Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi.

Table 3: State wise Maoist Violence from 2009–2012

State	2009		2010		2011		2012	
	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths
Andhra Pradesh	66	18	100	24	54	9	67	13
Bihar	232	72	307	97	316	63	166	44

State	2009		2010		2011		2012	
	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths
Chhattisgarh	529	290	625	343	465	204	370	109
Jharkhand	742	208	501	157	517	182	480	163
Madhya Pradesh	1	-	7	1	8	-	11	-
Maharashtra	154	93	94	45	109	54	134	41
Odisha	266	67	218	79	192	53	171	45
Uttar Pradesh	8	2	6	1	1	-	2	-
West Bengal	255	158	350	258	92	45	6	-
Others	5	-	5	-	6	1	8	-
Total	2258	908	2213	1005	1760	611	1415	415

Review and Monitoring Mechanism

The Government has instituted a number of review and monitoring mechanisms for different aspects of Maoist problem and the measures needed to deal with it. These include:

- i. A Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of States concerned, under the chairmanship of the Union Home Minister, to work out a coordinated strategic policy and tactical measures to deal with the problem simultaneously on political, security and development fronts.
- ii. A Review Group (earlier called Task Force) under the Cabinet Secretary to review efforts across a range of development and security measures.
- iii. A Coordination Centre chaired by the Union Home Secretary to review and coordinate the efforts of the State Governments, where the State Governments are represented by the Chief Secretaries and the Director Generals of Police.
- iv. A Task Force under the Special Secretary (Internal Security), Ministry of Home Affairs, with senior officers from Intelligence Agencies, Central Armed Police Forces and State Police Forces, to monitor and coordinate counter- Maoist efforts.
- v. An Empowered Group of Officers under the Chairpersonship of Member Secretary, Planning Commission has been set up by the Government to over ride or modify existing instructions on implementation of various development programmes and flagship schemes, having regard to the local needs and conditions in Maoist affected areas. The affected States have been asked to constitute

an Empowered Group in the State also.

Specific measures taken by the Government of India (GoI)

Government of India (GoI) has taken concrete measures to counter the Maoist. The GoI deployed forces under the green hunt in the tribal dominated and PESA area. The effort yielded results to reduce the Maoist insurgency movement but hindering the development and empowerment process of the Tribal communities.

A. Security Related Measures

- i. **Deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs):** Battalions of CAPFs are currently deployed for assisting the State Police in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
- ii. **CoBRA Battalions:** Battalions of Special Force trained and equipped for counter insurgency and jungle warfare operations, named as Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA) have been raised as a part of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). These Battalions have been deployed in the Maoist affected States.
- iii. **Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme:** Under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, the Union Government reimburses the expenditure relating to ex-gratia payment, training and operational needs of security forces, as also for assistance to Maoist cadres who surrender in accordance with the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the State Government concerned, community policing,

security related infrastructure for village defense committees and publicity material. An allocation of 207.54 crore has been made in BE 2012-13 under the scheme, out of which 171.56 crore has been spent upto 28th February, 2013.

- iv. **Fortified Police Stations:** The Central Government has been implementing a scheme to assist the State Governments in construction/strengthening of 400 Fortified Police Stations @ 2 crore each in Maoist affected Districts on 80:20 basis. Under this Scheme, 220 crore was released to the States during 2010-11 and 2011-12. In the current year 2012-13 (up to 28th February, 2013) 136.50 crore has been released.
- v. **Scheme for Special Infrastructure:** The Scheme for Special Infrastructure in Maoist affected States was approved in the 11th Five Year Plan, with an outlay of 500 crore, to cater to critical infrastructure gaps, which cannot be covered under the existing schemes. These relate to requirements of mobility for the Police/ Security Forces by upgrading existing roads/ tracks in inaccessible areas, providing secure camping grounds and helipads at strategic locations in remote and interior areas, measures to enhance security in respect of Police Stations/ Outposts located in vulnerable areas, etc. So far, 445.82 crore has been released to the States under the scheme (100 crore in 2008-09, 30 crore in 2009-10, 130 crore in 2010- 11 and 185.82 crore in 2011-12).
- vi. **India Reserve Battalions:** The Maoist affected States have been sanctioned India Reserve (IR) battalions to strengthen the security apparatus of the State. 37 IR battalions were sanctioned to 9 affected States, of which 33 have been raised. One IR Battalion each in Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand and Maharashtra has been converted into Specialised India Reserve Battalions (SIRBs). Besides, 9 new SIRBs have been sanctioned to the Maoist affected States of Andhra Pradesh (1), Bihar (1) Chhattisgarh (2), Jharkhand (2), Orissa (2) and Maharashtra (1).
- viii. **CIAT Schools:** During the 11th Plan period, a scheme was approved to set up 20 Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorist (CIAT) schools, 4 Schools in Assam and 16 in Maoist affected States. The Ministry of Home Affairs is

providing an amount of 1.5 crore to each school for development of infrastructure. The Ministry is also bearing recurring expenditure thereon and for equipment up-gradation. The land for these schools is provided by the State Governments. They would also provide administrative support for running the schools.

Table 4: Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorist Schools Sanctioned in Maoist Affected States

Name of the State	Original Allocation	Revised Allocation	Functional
Bihar	4	3	3
Chhattisgarh	4	4	4
Jharkhand	4	4	2
Orissa	4	3	2
West Bengal	0	1	1
Total	16	15	12

- viii **Recruitment in Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs):** In order to wean away the potential youth from the path of militancy or Maoist, recruitment guidelines have been revised to permit 40% recruitment in CAPFs from the border areas and areas affected by militancy or Maoist.

B). Development Related Measures

- i. **Monitoring of Implementation of Flagship Programmes:** The Planning Commission has been monitoring the implementation of Flagship Programmes in 82 Integrated Action Plan (IAP) districts and also reviewing the progress of implementation through Video Conferencing of the following schemes: (a) Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY); (b) National Rural Health Mission (NRHM); (c) Ashram Schools; (d) Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA); (e) Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA); (f) National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP); (g) Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY); (h) Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS); (i) Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY); (j) Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.
- ii. **The Planning Commission is implementing the Integrated Action Plan (IAP):** For 82 selected Tribal and Backward districts for accelerated development. The aim of this

- initiative is to provide public infrastructure and services in these affected/contiguous Districts. Originally, a sum of 25 crore and 30 crore was released to 60 districts during the financial years 2010–11 and 2011–12 respectively. This Scheme has now been extended to 22 more Maoist affected districts, taking the total coverage to 82 districts. A total amount of 5,440 crore has been released to the districts concerned under the Scheme up to 28th February, 2013.
- iii. **The Ministry of Road Transport & Highways is implementing the Road Requirement Plan-I (RRP-I):** With an outlay of 7,300 crore for Maoist affected areas to build road stretches of 5,477 km. in 34 worst Maoist affected districts. The stretches for Phase II of Road Requirement Plan have been finalized by the Ministry of Home Affairs in consultation with the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways based on the priority indicated by the State Governments. The Phase II of the proposed Road Requirement Plan involves a total of 5,624 km. of road stretches along with bridges at an estimated cost of 9,400 crore.
 - iv. **Under the Prime Minister Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY):** The norms for maximum length of bridges has been increased from 50 mts to 75 mts and the population norm of 500 for habitations coverage under PMGSY has been relaxed to 250 for Maoist affected areas. Also the minimum tender package amount under PMGSY has been reduced to 50 lakh.
 - v. **Provision of Funds on a 100% Grant basis:** Against a 50:50 ratio has been approved for Maoist affected districts for establishment of hostels for Scheduled Tribe girls and boys as well as Ashram schools in Tribals sub-plan areas.
 - vi. **The Ministry of Environment and Forests has given General Approval:** Under section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 for diversion of forest land in Maoist affected areas from 1.00 ha to 5.00 ha for activities like schools, dispensaries/hospitals, electrical and telecommunication lines, drinking water, water/rain water harvesting structures, minor irrigation canal, nonconventional sources of energy, skill up-gradation/vocational training center, power sub-stations, rural roads, communication posts; and police establishments like police stations/outposts/ border outposts/watch towers in sensitive areas and laying of optical fiber cables, telephone lines and drinking water supply lines.
 - vii. **Under the Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY):** The ceiling of per unit cost has been increased of IAY house from 45,000 to 48,500 for Maoist affected districts.
 - viii. **Effective Implementation of the Provisions of the Panchayats Extension to the Scheduled Areas Act, 1996 (PESA):** The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 has been emphasized time and again with the State Governments concerned. The Ministry of Tribal Affairs have issued comprehensive guidelines to State Governments/UT Administrations on 12th July, 2012 for expeditious recognition of forest rights under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 and have also amended the Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Rules 2008 on 6th September, 2012 to strengthen the same.
 - xi. **Civic Action Programme:** Under this scheme financial grants are sanctioned to Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) to undertake Civic Action Programme in the Maoist affected States. This is a successful scheme which aims to build bridges between the local population and security forces. During the financial year 2012–13 an amount of 20 crore has been provisioned for Civic Action Programme, out of which 13.27 crore has been released to CAPFs upto 28th February, 2013.
 - x. **Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy:** At present the rehabilitation package, inter alia, includes a stipend of 2,000 for three years, vocational training, immediate grant of 1.5 lakh and incentives for surrender of weapons. Revised guidelines offering better financial package for surrender-cum-rehabilitation of Maoists, inter alia, offering an immediate grant of 2.5 lakh for top Maoist cadres and 1.5 lakh for hardcore Maoist cadres including a monthly stipend of 4,000 each for a maximum period of 36 months is likely to be implemented soon.
 - xi. **Central Scheme for Assistance to Civilian Victims/Family of Victims of Terrorist/Maoist/Communal Violence:** The broad aim

of the Scheme is to assist families of victims of Terrorist, Communal and Maoist violence. An amount of 3 lakh is given for each death or permanent incapacitation to the affected family under the scheme. The amount of 3 lakh would be put in a fixed deposit account in a Nationalized Bank for a minimum lock-in period of 3 years. The interest on the above sum would be credited directly by the bank to the beneficiaries saving account on a quarterly basis. At the end of the lock in period, the principal amount of 3 lakh would be transferred directly to the saving account of the beneficiary. The financial assistance is released by the District Magistrate/Deputy Commissioner/Collector on behalf of the State Government. This amount is subsequently reimbursed to the State Government by the Ministry of Home Affairs. During the year 2012-13, an amount of 4.71 crore has been released by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Recommendations

- The corruption is one of the giant problems at the grass roots. The people are fully negative to the problem but not the Government. The Government needs to tackle the corruption to sustain the developmental activities for the empowerment of the people in unreached areas.
- The Government should implement the welfare activities simultaneously with counter insurgency measures.
- The information dissemination regarding development and welfare of the people is most important than guerrilla warfare and curbing the Maoists.
- Besides the armed warfare activities, the Government needs to negotiate with the Maoist to emit the rebellion against the Government.
- The Government expenditure is mostly limited to the fortification of the police stations and procurement of arms and ammunition. The coordination among the forces on the ground is clearly missing and their mobility has been curtailed due to geographical constraints.
- The state must re-establish connectivity with local and tribal people as this can hit the Maoist the most where it matters. The process of development must also have a human face to prevent tribal alienation.
- The security forces can only deal with the problem but not solve it. As far as the dialogue is concerned, a lot of negative connotation has been attached to the term 'dialogue'.
- It is a political war, wherein the current political system is being questioned by a group, which believes that another alternative system is good for society. It is important to convince the people and neutralize the belief that revolutionary politics is necessary and relevant.
- The government has failed to exploit the media to expose the true brutality of the Maoists. The Maoist have exploited the media much better than we have. If someone produces a video called blazing fields, it goes all over the world. Perhaps the Government should start its own Indian Media blitzkrieg or the media could take some proactive actions towards this.
- You have to have different strategies for differently affected areas. Since they are targeting democracy, we should use democracy to target them.
- A political issue like the Maoist conflict with socio-economic roots is left untouched until it escalates to a point where the Government is forced to act. At an escalated stage the issue demands more time, energy and resources and is unable to seek the results that could be achieved if it was to be nipped in the bud.
- The ideal manner in tackling any of these conflicts is to indigenize and localize them with least use of outside forces. Currently, instead of privileging the strengthening of the state police forces, the central police forces have been strengthened to treat the LWE-affected areas.
- A people sensitive approach is inevitable to resolve this conflict. This fundamentally requires political willingness at the level of state governments with the knowledge of local politics to take initiatives to recognize this people's problem with resources from the central Government.
- A strategy to cease this conflict indubitably needs to recognize the problems of the people who resorted to using arms.
- It is impossible to deal with the issue in a short period of time. A long term vision in

this direction is demanded for successful implementation of the counter Maoist strategies.

- Key to the success of the state of Andhra Pradesh in countering Maoist crisis has not been only in the construction of roads to remote areas of the state alone, but also in developing local production centers.
- The capacity building program is primarily based on the reverse application of revolutionary field tactics.
- The proactive approach from the police forces as well as from the state administration has been able to gain the trust of the masses, especially through community development programs.
- The new media could to be utilized with a conscious effort to mould or influence the opinions of those who can avail the luxury of new media.
- Additional aspects of the problem such as ideology, development and outreach of the Government are yet to be addressed and till present this has not been engaged with sufficiently as there is no uniformed battle plan.
- If we discuss the Maoist causative factors, they revolved around abysmal poverty, under development and a lack of infrastructure.
- The problem needs to be understood and women need to be gainfully recruited otherwise.
- Innovative measures need to take precedence over traditional methods. The strategy needs to be looked from three different perspectives, the local, national and international perspectives.
- When one says that the situation is improving, other indicators are easily missed - the organisational network may have improved but if one is to base it on the number of incidents, the problem is actually long term.
- The Government needs to balance its response but more importantly it needs to focus on a third aspect of the problem; the ideology in the minds of people.
- The Maoist problem cannot be curbed until the Government makes significant changes in its policies. The difference between the law made and law enforced has to disappear.
- Proper measures should be taken by the Government to run the schools and not give it as a shelter to the army and the police personnel. Using localized democratic, development units is the answer.
- Political vacuum exists because a dialogue with political leadership is not sustained. Tribal should be included and involved in a big way in development process, policies under consideration to make the tribes the stakeholders.
- The killing of the extremists is not the solution to solve the problems of Maoist. The Government should find out the root cause of the problem at the grass root level.

Conclusion

The current year has seen a decline in violence perpetrated by the CPI (Maoists). This is a continuation of the trend witnessed last year. The situation in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh has remained by and large peaceful. The States of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal have witnessed complete turnaround. In the States of Bihar and Orissa, the security environment has also improved. However, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand remain the core areas of Maoist insurgency. The Government of India in partnership with the States concerned has articulated a 'clear, hold and develop approach through security and development related schemes. In many Maoist affected areas, these steps are reaching criticality. However, the CPI (Maoist) continues to attack development infrastructure to keep the population in their areas of influence marginalized and outside the purview of mainstream development process. But in significantly large swathes of area previously affected by the Maoist problem, local communities are beginning to realize the hollowness of the Maoist ideology. There is a growing belief that the ideological paradigm offered by the CPI (Maoist) is completely out of sync with the inspirational matrix of present day Indian society and the world. In addition, the violence and brutality perpetrated by the CPI (Maoist) in States like Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand is resulting in widespread revulsion against them. Also, the propaganda machinery of the CPI (Maoist) led by their Front Organizations and cheer leaders stands discredited and exposed. The peace can be conciliated through democratic way; the insurgents were brought into the mainstream through their participation in the electoral process

(Gill, 1997; Bhaumik, 2007, pp. 12–13).

The tribal people in Schedule Five areas today are living through great hardship, conflict, dispossession, and cultural turmoil. The Social oppression, discrimination, extreme poverty and neglect experienced by the tribal are inexpressible due to Maoist and militarization of the PESA area. The Tribal society is deeply implicated in this. If PESA implemented strictly we can reduce the Maoist some extent and it might help us as a democracy, to begin rewriting this tragic story. Incidentally, this may be the last opportunity that the State may have to retrieve PESA.

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